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THE IMPORTANCE OF CONGRESS 
by Joseph Cooper 
The study of Congress has made great strides in recent decades. Given 
the work of Fenno, Matthews, Truman, Dexter, Huitt, Miller, Stokes, and 
a host of others, there is little doubt that our understanding of Congressional 
behavior has greatly improved since the end of the Second World War. Yet 
in one crucial area little progress has been made. Understanding of Congress' 
role in the American political system and its significance for the successful 
operation of that system remains quite backward. Thus, on the popular or 
nonscholarly level of discourse formulations of Congress' role and signifi- 
cance continue to be framed in the traditional and vague rhetoric of demo- 
cratic ideology, e.g., that a strong and independent Congress is vital to free- 
dom. Nor have political scientists done much to raise the level of discourse 
above the plane of rhetoric. Typically, formulations of Congress' role in the 
literature cite such functions as law making, administrative oversight, repre- 
sentation, impeachment, education of the populace, amendment of the Con- 
stitution, etc,' As such, these formulations too are of limited value. Catalog- 
ing functions in this manner obscures more than it reveals. It leads not only 
to confusion since there is little coherence in or discrimination among the 
functions lumped together, but also sheds little light on Congress' role in 
and contribution to the political system as a whole since the delineation of 
functions is not guided by and has no relevance in terms of a more general 
analytical framework. In truth, then, mere cataloging is not theory, but 
simply an excuse for theory. 
Such a situation needs to be corrected. An inadequate formulation of 
Congress' role and significance in the American political system impedes a 
full understanding and appreciation of Congress. What results is sophisti- 
cated understanding of discrete aspects of internal operation and particular 
linkages between Congress and its environment combined with quite prim- 
itive conceptions of the nature and consequences of Congress' position as a 
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subsystem of the larger political system. Moreover, an inadequate formula- 
tion of Congress' role and significance in the American political system im- 
pedes evaluation of its performance, identification of its defects, and analysis 
of tlte most promising line of improvement. What results is treatment of 
Congress as an isolated entity, often in highly mechanistic terms, without 
much understanding of either the necessary dimensions of its role or the 
potential for and constraints on change, 
TIie object of this article is to begin the task of defining a satisfactory 
formulation of Congress' role and significance in the American political 
system. In so doing we shall approach the problem in functional terms and 
focus on the needs of the Amcrican political system and Congress' contri- 
bution to the satisfaction of these needs. 
I. Ft4i~ctioircil Needs 
All political systems strive to maintain their capacity to make authorita- 
tive decisions on goals, to make decisions on goals that will be binding both 
because tliey are capable of being legitimatized and because they are cap- 
able of being enforced.' The reasons for this derive from the basic nature 
and ends of political systems abstractly conceived. The political system ex- 
ists as the subsysten~ of the social system that arises to satisfy the broader 
system's need for arrangements and mechanisms to define and implement its 
goals as a co~lectivity. Thus, maintenance of the capacity to make authorita- 
tive decisions on goals stands as its primary operational imperative. More- 
over, all social systems require that certain minimal conditions of order 
prevail as a prerequisite of their existence and the presence of such condi- 
tions is dependent on the existence of arrangements and mechanisms that 
can define decisions that are binding on all members of the collectivity. 
Thus, maintcnance of the capacity to make authoritative decisions on goals 
and the political system's role in goal specification on behalf of the broader 
system are ciosely intertwined. 
Nonetheless, political systems do not necessarily limit their ends to main- 
tenance nor their role in goal specification to the preservation of order. 
Rather, since the goals of social systems typically extend to the enhance- 
ment as well as the prescrvation of the conditions of common life, political 
systems that possess a modicum of sophistication and stability strive to 
foster the well-being of citizens over and above what is rcquircd to protect 
the social system from external threats and to maintain internal tranquility. 
Democratic political systems are distinctive not only in terms of the dorni- 
nant patterns of value and belief that govern and delimit definitions of 
citizen well-being, but also in terms of the institutional consequences these 
values and beliefs have on the arrangements and mechanisms employed in 
making authoritative decisions on goals. In such systems the hold of values 
THE IMPORTANCE OF  CONGRESS 55 
that center on the sanctity of individual personality combined with the hold 
of beliefs that foster social trust and confidence in citizen competence lead 
to a complex of arrangements and mechanisms designed to base the deter- 
mination and impIementation of authoritative goals on consent.' For such 
values and beliefs both require collective goals to remedy impingements on 
the lives of individual citizens and establish citizen preferences as the ulti- 
mate determinant of the propriety and adequacy of the goals pursued. 
Thus, in democratic political systems the arrangements and mechanisms 
employed in decision making are biased in the following directions: in favor 
of treating citizen claims or demands as critical sources of information re- 
garding the needs of collective life and the adequacy of the authoritative 
goals previously defined and implemented; in favor of according all such 
claims or  demands equal status and opportunity to influence policy out- 
comes; and in favor of requiring decisions on the nature and implementation 
of authoritative goals to attain as high a Ievel of acceptability among the 
general population as is compatible with the preservation of a capacity for 
effective ac t i~n .  As a result, the arrangements and mechanisms employed 
are shaped by the necessity of satisfying four basic functional needs. First, 
they must be designed to foster the articulation of demands on the part of 
individuals and groups in the social system. Second, they must be designed 
to provide such demands with access to the structures charged with the de- 
termination and implementation of authoritative goals and to insure that 
officials, i.e., those who occupy positions in these structures, display a high 
degree of responsiveness to these demands. Third, they must be designed to 
foster the accommodation of demands and the aggregation of support in 
order to achieve high levels of acceptability for decisions that define and 
implement authoritative goals, without at the same time setting the require- 
ments for reconciliation and agreement so high as to vitiate the political 
system's ability to act to remedy sources of stress. Finally, they must be de- 
signed to provide means of holding those charged with the implementation 
of authoritative goals accountable for their actions in order to insure that 
these officials perform their duties in a responsible, effective, and nonarbi- 
trary manner. 
11. Aiticulcitioi~, Access, nrzd Respai~sivei~ess 
In the American political system Congress serves as one of the key mcch- 
anisms involved in the satisfaction of all four of these needs. This is neither 
a fortuitous nor an incidental result. On the contrary, Congress' presence 
and prerogatives are a direct response fo the prime functional needs of the 
American political system as a democratic system and it exists as a source 
of inputs that are of critical significance for the satisfaction of these needs. 
The articulation of demands on the national level would be severely cir- 
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cumscribed if not for the existence of Congress. Such articulation involves 
a reciprocal relationship between leaders and followers. To  a significant ex- 
tent, opinion is inchoate and requires activation and organization by actors 
who have a stake in the articulation of demands if grievances are to be 
transformed into explicit demands. It is true of course that in democratic 
political systems elected officials and rivals for their positions are neither the 
only actors with stakes in the articulation of demands nor sufficient as a 
group to satisfy the need for such actors. Nonetheless, it is the subjection of 
officials to election that provides the basic foundations for a set of induce- 
ments that are general enough to cause a wide distribution of stakes in the 
articulation of demands. As a result, election exists as the single most im- 
portant stimulus for articulation and the attributes of the election system 
have a crucial effect on articulation.' Indeed, unless other factors are in a 
state of severe imbalance, the degree to which grievances are articulated as 
demands will vary roughly with the degree of elaborateness in the election 
system. 
Thus, in the American political system Congress provides an essentiaI 
supplement to the stimulus for articulation provided by the Presidency. If 
the Presidency existed as the only office in the election system, the degree to 
which the articulation of demands would be fostered on the national level 
would be severely impeded. The paucity of contests and contestants wouId 
result in a circumscription of inducements, stakes, and actors. Equally im- 
portant, since any single constituency principle or definition inevitably 
favors certain interests, articulation would be impeded both by biases in the 
set of inducements provided to actors who seek to influence rather than to 
occupy official positions and by the effects the Presidency's constituency base 
would have in leading contestants for the office to direct their attention and 
preference to the configuration of interests that control Presidential elec- 
tions. T o  be sure, some compensation for these defects could probably be 
secured from increased reliance on nonelective or administrative officials as 
actors in the articulation of demands. But given the indirect tie nonelective 
officials have to the electorate plus the rigidities in outlook that stem from 
commitment to existing programs and confidence in superior knowledge, 
such officiaIs are a poor substitute for the multiplicity of elective offices and 
diversity of constituency principles provided by Congress. 
The case on behalf of Congress made with respect to articulation applies 
to access and responsiveness as well. Here again the satisfaction of these 
needs tends to vary with the degree of elaborateness in the election system. 
To  be sure, all political systems provide citizen demands with some degree 
of access and display some degree of responsiveness to them. Citizen de- 
mands cannot be totally ignored if a system is to maintain its capacity to 
make binding decisions, though they may be treated essentially as items for 
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manipulation rather than satisfaction. However, if channels of access are to 
be made available to a wide spectrum of groups and individuals in the social 
system and citizen demands are to be treated essentially as items to be sat- 
isfied rather than manipulated, an election system becomes a critical neces- , 
sity. It is the direct tie between citizens and officials which election involves 
that establishes the conditions necessary to provide and insure both a high 
degree of openness to a wide variety of citizen demands and a high degree 
of concern with the satisfaction of such demands. On the one hand, election 
establishes relations of dependency with the result that the officials involved 
are both open to citizen demands and serve as intermediaries for citizen de- 
mands upon officials not subject to election.Wn the other hand, since the 
officials who are subject to election normally control the authority and re- 
sources of those who are not, these officials too must be open and responsive 
to citizen demands in recognition and anticipation of the consequences that 
derive from the relation between citizens and elected officials. 
Thus, in the American political system Congress supplements the amount 
of access and responsiveness the Presidency provides to a critical degree. 
If the Presidency existed as the only elective office, access and responsive- 
ness on the national level would be severely restricted. The fact that the 
Presidency exists as a single office would severely impair both opportunities 
for access and inducen~ents for responsiveness. In any large nation no single 
office can sustain the conditions necessary to provide comprehensive oppor- 
tunities for access or the conditions necessary to insure a high degree of 
responsiveness to a wide variety of demands and this is especially so in a 
nation where interests are as numerous and diverse as in the United States. 
Similarly, the fact that the Prcsidency is based on a single constituency prin- 
ciple would reinforce the impairments to access and responsiveness, given 
the distortions present in any particular constituency principle. If the direct 
tie between citizens and officials that election provides were to be limited 
solely to the Presidency, opportunities for access and inducements for re- 
sponsiveness would be highly biased in favor of the interests that control 
Presidential elections, even though such interests, while important, are far 
from exhaustive. Once again some compensation for all these defects could 
be secured from increased reliance on nonelective or administrative officials. 
Still, the same factors that make such reliance a poor substitute for the mul- 
tiplicity of officers and diversity of constituency principles provided by Con- 
gress in the case of articulation make it an even poorer substitute in the 
case of access and responsiveness. 
111. Accornmodcition and Aggregcrtion 
Congress' role in accommodation and aggregation is equally vital. How- 
ever, analysis of Congress' critical significance for the accommodation of 
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demands and aggregation of support requires both a more lengthy discus- 
sion and a brief digression to preface the discussion. 
The intent of the preceding pages has not been to argue that the func- 
tionality of election systems in democratic political systems varies directly 
in relation to the degree of their elaborateness. On the contrary, since de- 
mands must be accommodated and support for particular lines of action 
aggregated if alternatives are to be defined and choices made, Iimits exist 
to the degree to which it is desirable to stimulate the differentiation of de- 
mands and to establish relations of dependency between officials and citizen 
demands.'. Rather, our intent was simply to argue that without the existence 
of Congress provision for articulation, access, and responsiveness on the 
national level would be severely restricted, that it would be inadequate to 
satisfy the needs the American political system does have for differentiation 
and dependency. A similar point applies to the accommodation of demands 
and aggregation of support. This need, too, though crucial, must be satisfied 
rather than maximized. Democratic systems have to preserve their capacity 
to act as well as their capacity to base action on approval and support. 
It is within such constraints that Congress' role in the accommodation of 
demands and aggregation of support must be understood. The American 
political system cannot and does not posit unanimity or even near unanimity 
as a prerequisite for action. Rather, limits on the degree of reconciliation 
and agreement required for action permeate the processes involved in ac- 
commodation and aggregation, e.g., the majority principle. Nonetheless, 
the American political system docs strivc to attain high levels of acceptabil- 
ity for programs of action and its ability to do so on the national level would 
be seriously impaired if not for the existence of Congress. 
In the American political system as in all democratic systems the attain- 
ment of high levels of program acceptability encompasses all three of the 
decision-making stages involved in the definition and implementation of 
authoritative goak7  The work of accommodating demands and aggregating 
support begins at the eIectora1 stase as a consequence of the subjection of 
key officials to election. Intransigency in the assertion of demands is penal- 
ized and flexibility rewarded by the existence of limits to the elaborateness 
of the election system.' Thus, elections serve not only to differentiate, but 
also to unify. They induce the compromise and combination of demands and 
the aggregation of support for policy proposals as part of the process of 
mobilizing support for candidates. Moreover, the degree of accommodation 
and aggregation achieved at the electoral stage is of great significance for 
subsequent decision-making stages. The variety and complexity of demands 
must be reduced and lines of support for policy proposals delineated if 
accomn~odation and aggrcgation arc to be carried on successfully once the 
focus of decision making shifts from the mobilization of support for candi- 
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dates to the mobilization of support for specific, detailed programs of action. 
The next decision-making stage, the stage at which specific programs are 
formally authorized and funded, is of equal, if not greater, importance than 
the electoral stage. In all democratic orders the degree of accommodation 
and aggregation that can be achieved at the electoral stage is restricted. The 
very features of an election system that serve to penalize intransigency and 
reward flexibility, e.g., large rather than small constituencies, geographical 
rather than functional representation, plurality rather than proportional 
voting, etc., inhibit highly precise forms of accommodation and aggregation 
on any comprehensive basis. As a consequence, though success at the sec- 
ond stage is highly dependent on the character of results at the electoral 
stage, much of the work of accommodation and aggregation must be post- 
poned to and achieved at this stage. 
This effect, moreover, is intensified in the American political system by 
the loose and weak programmatic character of the main agents and instru- 
ments of accon~modation and aggregation, the major political parties. As a 
result, though elections do induce precise forms of accommodation and 
aggregation on a segmented basis, i.e., within and among particular groups 
on particular issues, and the formation of broad coalitions among overIap- 
ping clusters of organized and unorganized portions of the population, the 
overall consequences of elections serve only to establish general orientations 
to policy through the bestowal of advantage on classes of demand that form 
part of winning coalitions and to provide materials for fashioning program 
decisions through the delineation of patterns of demand and support." 
Thus, the American political system places a heavier burden on the sec- 
ond stage than a number of other democratic systems. At this stage basic 
decisions on thc concrete nature of additions to or modifications of authori- 
tative goals must be made and made in such a way that results are accept- 
able to most groups and elements in the population, whereas the weighted 
pattern of demands and bases of support that emerge from the electoral 
stage furnish only a general framework and materials for decision. 
Fically, despite the importance of the second stage, in the American 
political system as in other democratic political systems, decision making at 
this stage does not exhaust the need for accommodation and aggregation. 
Rather, the work of building agreement continues and must continue into 
the third stage, the stage at which decisions on authoritative goals are 
implemented. 
Though concrete and detailed programs of action are defined at the sec- 
ond stage, all questions of policy are not and cannot be resolved at this 
stage. I n  part, this result is intended. Just as the ends of accornmodation 
and aggregation are servcd at the first stage by not seeking to rcsolve dif- 
ferences past the point necessary to form a coalition capable of electing a 
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candidate, so too at the second stage certain questions and issues may be 
left open in the interests of mobilizing support for a specific program. In 
large part, however, it is an inescapable result. Since the problems that must 
be dealt with are highly complex, decision makers at the second stage have 
neither the time nor the foresight to resolve all policy questions, to resolve 
all questions regarding the nature of authoritative goals. Consequently, a 
great deal of discretion must often be delegated to administrative officials. 
The third stage, thus, is not simply a ministerial one. Though officials at 
this stage usually operate within a far more precisely defined context than 
officials at the second stage, they too must participate in the accommodation 
of demands and aggregation of support if the highest levels of program ac- 
ceptability consonant with the achievement of program objectives are to be 
attained. As a result, democratic orders must and do seek to politicize the 
administrative process. In the American political system as in other demo- 
cratic political systems this is accomplished primarily by making elected 
officials the source of the legal authority and funds empIoyed in the admin- 
istrative process and by placing elected officials at the top rungs of the ad- 
ministrative apparatus. I n  this way both elective and nonelective administra- 
tive officials are placed in a position where they can have their decisions 
reversed and their positions undermined if  they fail to please groups and 
elements in the population with leverage over elective positions. Hence, 
officials at the third stage are induced to strive both to maintain the frame- 
work of aggregated support for a program that derives from preceding 
stages and to limit or at least not aggravate the costs imposed on elements 
of the population whose interests are adversely affected. 
Given all this, the critical role Congress plays in satisfying the American 
political system's need for accon~modation and aggregation can easily be 
shown. At the electoral stage the plurality of offices Congress provides adds 
significantly to the induccnlents for accon~modation and aggregation and 
thus greatly enhances the possibility of more precise forms of accommoda- 
tion and aggregation at subsequc~lt decision-making stages. If the electoral 
system on the national level were limited to a Presidential election, the con- 
sequences of election in terms of simplifying and assigning weights to de- 
mands and establishing bases of support for proposed policies would be far 
more hazy and imprecise. A national contest for a single office suffers from 
the range of demands to be accon~modated and the bases of support to be 
aggregated and this is especially true in the American poIitical system where 
the interest configuration is so varied and complex that i t  rules out the con- 
struction of majority coalitions by national parties on any but a highly vague 
and incongruent basis."' As a result, even in terms of the limited potential 
for accommodation and aggregation at the electoral stage, the ability of 
contests for the Presidency to induce accommodation of demands and ag- 
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gregation of support for specific lines of policy in the American political 
system is extremely restricted, except in those few instances where highly 
visible and encompassing policy issues are involved, i.e., where demands 
have an intense, immediate, and easily recognizable effect on the lives of 
large portions of the pop~ilation.'~ In contrast, local and state elections in- 
volve more limited groups and elements of the population. consequently, 
accommodation and aggregation can be carried further, though with refer- 
ence to a narrower range of issues. Howevcr, since the consequences of local 
and state elections involve the resultants of a multiplicity of such elections 
whose sum embraces the political systenl as a whole, the totality of out- 
comes defines patterns of demand and support in all issue areas. 
Thus, on the whole, a ~nultiplicity of local and state elections provides a 
more concrete and malleable set of materials for precise forms of accommo- 
dation and aggregation at subsequent decision-making stages than a national 
contest for a single office. In so doing they fill in interstices left open by the 
Presidenttal elcction and provide vital building blocks for achieving high 
levels of reconciliation and agreement at subsequent decision-making stages. 
Indeed, the etlect is dynaniic rather than static. The patterns of demand and 
support tliat are dcfined do not evaporate between elections. Rather, they 
furnish a continuing input into the system and are capable of various per- 
mutations and combinations as the focus of decision shifts from issue area 
to issue arca and as issues change and emerge in the interelection period. To 
be sure, if the President existed as the single elective officer at the national 
level, he and his agcnts would try to accommodate demands and aggregate 
support in the process of defining specific programs in order to maintain 
and augment the majority coalition that elected him. But even with the best 
of intentions the task would be exceedingly difficult and frustrating since the 
bases for achievit~g high levels of program acceptability would be far more 
amorphous. Undoubtedly, some further degree of accomnlodation and ag- 
gregation wouId occur, but to a far less extent than when patterns of de- 
mand and support supplied by a n~ultiplicity of local and state elections 
define the terms and providc the materials necessary to attain precise forms 
of accommodation and aggregation with reference to specific programs. 
Similarly, at the second and third stages the existence of Congress pro- 
vides a set of inducements vital to the achievement of high levels of program 
acceptability. At the second stagc the fact that the Presidcnt cannot rule 
by fiat but rather must win CongrcssionaI consent insures tliat the accom- 
modation of demands and agg re~ t ion  of support will be carried substan- 
tially forward from the levels attained at the electoral stage. 
It is true. of course, if Congress did not exist, inducements for accommo- 
dation and aggregation would still be present. As noted above, the Presi- 
dent's subjection to periodic election would provide inducements for further 
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accommodation and aggregation in the process of making concrete decisions 
on authoritative goals. Moreover, the need to gain the cooperation and ac- 
quiescence of citizens in the implementation of programs would also provide 
incentives for the recognition and satisfaction of demands at the second 
stage. Nonetheless, the ability of both types of inducements to lead the Pres- 
ident and the agents on whom he would rely to modify important aspects of 
pet proposals would leave much to be desired. 
The need to gain the cooperation or acquiescence of citizens is a far less 
pressing one than the need to win their consent or the consent of a body 
of their representatives and it can be met by manipulation, force, and/or 
mere token satisfactions of demand. Indeed, it usually produces substantiaI 
incentives for accommodation only when officials egregiously misjudge the 
limits of citizen tolerance. I t  thus provides a very frail reed on which to 
rely given the attachment officials form for their programs and their ten- 
dency to regard their own wisdom as superior. As for the inducements that 
derive from election of the President, here too great elements of weakness 
exist. The length of the President's term, the broad and multifaceted char- 
acter of his coalition, the restriction of options that flow from electoral con- 
trol of a singIe, national office, the advantages of incumbency, and the 
President's ability to win support on nonprogrammatic grounds all serve to 
reduce the incentives for the recognition and satisfaction of demands that 
interfere with the cherished policy goals of the President and his key agents. 
These inducements too, then, are severely limited and vary greatly in rela- 
tion to the status of a group or element of the population vis-2-vis the 
President's electoral coalition, its importance to and independence of that 
coalition, and the degree to which a particular issue raises fundamental 
problems of continued loyalty for that group or element of the population. 
In contrast, the presence and prerogatives of Congress at the second stage 
serve to correct these deficiencies. In each and every area of policy the 
existence of a body of men whose constituencies differ from that of the 
President and whose consent must be secured before programs can be 
authorized and funded forces the President to come to terms with a variety 
of demands he might otherwise ignore. Moreover, it performs this function 
not only on behalf of opposing groups but on behalf of portions of his own 
broad electoral coalition as well. Nor, as is often alleged, are the results of 
Congress' position and prerogatives simply to expand the influence of local 
or particularistic interests. Since citizens in Congressional constituencies 
have interests that are wider than their states or localities and since national 
elections draw on and reward groups and segments of the population with 
particularistic interests, both Congress and the Presidency represent a mix 
of general and particularistic demands, though admittedly the nature and 
proportion of the mix vary. Hence, the value of the inducements for accom- 
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modation and aggregation that Congress provides are not undermined by 
their character. On the contrary, Congress' position and prerogatives at the 
second stage serve to remedy the distortions that stem from reliance on any 
single constituency principle. It thus not only provides much, if not most, 
of the motive power for further acconimodation and aggregation at the 
second stage, but also broadcns the scope of accommodation by making its 
own distinctive mix of general and particularistic demands a factor in de- 
cision making. 
The argument made with reference to the critical significance of Con- 
gress' role in the accommodation of demands and aggregation of support at 
the second stage applies in general to the third stagc as well. To be sure, in 
the process of implementing authoritative goals as in the process of specify- 
ing them the President's subjcction to pcriodic elcction and the need to gain 
the cooperation and acquiescence of citizens have their effects. However, 
once again in the absence of Congress the possibility of making additional, 
substantial gains by nay of reconciling differences and broadening or ex- 
tending bases of support would be greatly impaired. In part, the reasons for 
this stem from the same factors that are controlling at the second stage: 
the restricted nature of the inducements for accomn~odation and aggrega- 
tion that derive from quadrennial Presidential elections and the need to 
placate the govcrncd. In part, howcvcr, another hitherto unmentioned factor 
is also of great importance: the difficulty of Presidential direction and con- 
trol of rhe bureaucrattc establishment. In other words, in the American 
political system as in other democratic political systems the influence of the 
inducements for accomniodation and aggregation that stem from election 
of the chief administrative officer is undcr~nined by the limited time, knowl- 
edge, and span of attention of the rciatively small political segment of the 
executive branch on which this officer must rely. As a result, the immense 
bureaucratic core of the executive branch has great ability to evade or even 
negate pressure for further accomtnodation that is channeled through its 
nominal superiors and to follow instead its own policy  predisposition^.'^ 
Thus, at the third stage as at the second, the presence and prerogatives 
of Congress serve to correct deficiencies that would exist in its absence. Its 
control over legal authority and funds allow it both to intervene in decision 
making at this stage through investigations, appropriations restrictions, in- 
formal contacts, etc,, and to transfer the locus of decision back to the second 
stage in instances in which opposition to executive decisions is particularly 
intense and widespread. As a result, officials at a11 levels of the executive 
branch must take citizen sentiment expressed directly or indirectly through 
Congress into account in the exercise of their discretionary authority: they 
must anticipate reaction and deal with response as they seek to spell out 
the implications of authorized program goals in order to ward off the pen- 
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alties Congress can impose on their careers and their programs. Hence, 
Congress>resence and prerogatives add substantially to the strength of the 
inducements for acconlmodation and aggregation at the third stage. Here 
as elsewhere, the presence of an independent and influential popularly 
elected legislative mechanism is essential to supplen~ent and reinforce the 
benefits that flow from election of the chief administrative officer if the 
system's need for accon~nlodation and aggregation is to be satisfied. 
Thus far we have dealt with three of the four functional needs whose 
satisfaction we identified earlier as prerequisites for the successful opera- 
tion of a democratic political system. Let us conclude our analysis of the 
importance of Congress in the American political system by turning our 
attention to the fourth: the need to hold executive officers accountable for 
their performance in order to insure that they implement authoritative goals 
in a responsible. effective, and nonarbitrarj~ manner. 
So defined this need has a number of facets. By responsible implementa- 
tion we mean implementation that is in accord with or faithful to the goals 
defined in authorized programs. By effective implementation we mean im- 
plementation that achieves authorized program goals at minimum cost. By 
nonarbitrary implementation we mean inlplementation that is humane and 
fair procedurally. Now, to be sure, the need for accountability overlaps the 
need for accommodation and aggregation. The line between adherence to 
established program goals at the third stage of decision making and the 
exercise of discretion in defining subordinate goals at this stage is a relative 
rather than an absolute one. Moreovcr, the same powers and sanctions that 
give mechanisms the ability to hold executive officials accountable for their 
acts also provide leverage for inducing further acconlmodation and aggrega- 
tion in the course of executive decision making. Nonetheless, the two needs 
are indistinguishable. The ends of accountability are both narrower and 
broader: narrower i n  the sense that they are more restricted to formally 
defined goals and broader in the sense that they encompass the quality of 
performance. In sum, the need for accountability is a need for preventive 
and corrective control, a need premised on the assumption that the achieve- 
ment of authoritative goals cannot be trustcd simply to the good intentions 
and self-discipline of those charged with implementing these goals and the 
assumption that, given adequate sanctions, the ability to hold executive o&- 
cials accountable is the ability to prevent and correct pernicious forms of 
executive behavior.' : 
Once again, however, our intent is not to argue that Congress in and of 
itself is sufficient to satisfy the American political system's need for arrange- 
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ments or mechanisms to cnforce executive accountability. Rather, here as 
elsewhere, our point is simply that the system's ability to satisfy this need on 
the national level would be severely impaired if not for the existence of 
Congress. It is true, of course, that the subjection of the President to peri- 
odic election both establishes a mechanism for controlling the behavior of 
this official and his chief appointces and substantially reinforces the induce- 
ments these officials derive from their positions in the executive hierarchy 
to check tendencies toward aggrandizement of power, malfeasance, and 
officiousness among the larger mass of civil servants. Similarly, the federal 
courts provide basic guarantees of responsible and nonarbitrary behavior 
on the part of officials at all levels of the executivc branch. Still, the ability 
of a single national election to hold the President and his chief lieutenants 
accountable for their acts and the acts of their subordinates is limited as is 
the ability of these officials to check misdeeds on the part of their subordi- 
nates. The reasons for this have been touched on previously: the immense 
scope of Presidential elections which makes them cxtrenlely blunt instru- 
ments of control and the limited time, knowledge, and span of attention of 
the top political echelon of tlic executive branch. And to these factors can 
be added the limits of comnland and the need top officials have to win 
the cooperation of their subordinates, the desire of such officials to protect 
themselves against political attack, and the tendency of such officials to 
indulge in excusing or minimizing failurcs that occur within the areas of 
their responsibility. As for the federal courts, though the protections they 
provide are important, their reach is limited to flagrant instances of irre- 
sponsible or arbitrary behavior. 
Thus, Iiere again, Congress' role in die political system is of crucial sig- 
nificance for the satisfaction of a prime functional need. Its control over 
legal authority and funds combincd with its organizational resources give 
it the ability to subject any aspect of executive performance to detailed 
review, while the inducements it derives from its direct tie to the electorate 
endow it with a strong desire to find and correct instances of executive 
malfeasance or failure. Congress therefore exists as a potent instrument of 
accountability, one which is capable both of causing officials at all levels of 
the executive branch to be wary of irresponsible, ineffective, or arbitrary 
behavior and of punishing and correcting such behavior when it does occur. 
In short, then, the presence and prerogatives of Congress add substantially 
to the American political system's ability to hold executive officials account- 
able for thcir pcrformancc and by so doing provide a margin of protection 
against irresponsible, inefTective, and arbitrary behavior on the part of 
executive officials that is critical for the existence of adequate guarantees 
against such behavior. 
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We may conclude that Congress' existence and position in the American 
political system are not matters of indifference for the successfu1 operation 
of the system. Rather, the system's ability to achieve its ends is dependent 
on its ability to satisfy the basic functional needs we have outlined, and on 
the national level Congress constitutes a vital and indispensible factor in 
the satisfaction of these needs. 
All this, however, is not to argue that Congress as presently organized 
and as it presently operates is above reproach, In other words, it is not 
to prejudge the functionality of existing Congressional arrangements and 
mechanisnis, to prejudge the degree to which Congress contributes to the 
satisfaction of the system's prime needs. To  demonstrate that Congress is 
a source of inputs that are of critical significance for the satisfaction of 
these needs, we have necessarily had to treat it without regard for impedi- 
ments to its viability and effectiveness just as one would have to disregard 
them in explaining the critical significance of an engine to a car or an organ 
to the body. Our point, however, is only that the American political system's 
ability to satisfy its prime functional needs is dependent on Congress' role 
in and contribution to the system and to argue this is not to provide a 
blanket justification for the status quo. On the contrary, to see the satis- 
faction of general systcniic needs in relation to the adequacy of the arrange- 
ments and mechanisms established to serve these needs is also to see par- 
ticular components of the system in these terms. It is thus to recognize that 
as far as actual performance is concerned the degree to which Congress 
contributes to the satisfaction of general systemic needs can vary and is 
itself dependent on the adequacy of the particular arrangements and mech- 
anisms that define its external relations and internal processes. 
Nor do we wish to imply that our formulation of Congress' role and sig- 
nificance in the Anicrican political system does not stand in need of further 
refinemcnt and further elaboration. In the first rcgard, our formulation is 
open to rcfinenicnt on the basis of improved conceptualization of the 
ends of the American political systcm and the necds these ends establish. 
I n  addit~on, it is opcn to rcfincment on the basis of new empirical evidence 
or empirical evidence not adequately taken into account in our formulation. 
It is true, of course, that role formulation primarily involves abstraction 
on the basis of the accepted or governing values to be realized by behavior 
in particular social contexts. Thus, it is norms, rulcs of behavior derived 
from values, that definc roles. Still, in the case of Congress as ekewhere the 
task of abstraction from experience must be circumscribed and informed 
by fact, by actual behavior, if it is to produce an accurate and realistic result. 
In the second rcgard, David Truman has noted that understanding of 
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Congress and efforts to strengthen it have been stymied by lack of an ade- 
quate conception of Congress' "distinctive functions" in the American polit- 
ical system." We, however, have not framed our analysis in terms of distinc- 
tive functions, but rather in terms of the common functions performed by 
various, major subsystems in the political system. This is quite valid since 
on the most general level of abstraction there is nothing inherently distinc- 
tive about the functions Congress performs. It rather participates in the 
performance of the same functions as other major subsystems, e.g., the 
party system. Still, this does not mean that Truman's point is not well 
taken. It is also true, as our discussion of decision-making stages implies, 
that Congress for a variety of reasons, e .g ,  position in the system, size, 
capabilities, etc., has particular advantages and disadvantages that lead it 
and qualify it to perform distinctive aspects or portions of the general func- 
tions it shares with other major subsystems. Moreover, it can well be argued 
that any formulation of Congrcss' role that does not differentiate its func- 
tions in detail in relation to other major subsystems is deficient since roles 
when fully conccptiialized do not exist in isolation but rather as parts of a 
structure of roles, as parts of a structure of divided labor. If, then, we have 
not attempted any detailed delineation of Congress' distinctive functions, it 
is only because we havc assunlcd that this is not the point at which to begin 
in formulating Congress' role in the American political system, but rather 
something to be worked out in relation to a more general analytical frame- 
work. If our assumption is correct, such delineation is, as we have treated 
it, beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it exists as the logical point 
at which to extend or elaborate the franlework of conceptions and propo- 
sitions that we have defined. 
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